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“The fact is that terrorist groups behave much like deadly
viruses. Their reach is global in nature, they are tenacious, and
they adapt quickly to increase their chances of survival.”1
INTRODUCTION
The September 11 attacks in 2001 not only shocked the world, but
also spurred vast change in the U.S. government’s strategy for
fighting terror at home and abroad.2 The U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) realized that an approach focused on prevention—as opposed
to reaction—was vital to protect national security in the future.3
This prevention approach honed in on disrupting funding for terror
groups.4 At the core of the DOJ’s prevention approach was the
“material support” legislation under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.5
This legislation, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,6 operates under
the reality that money is “fungible.”7 In other words, any kind of
“material support or resources,”8 even if given to a terror organiza-
1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2008, at 2.9, https://www.
justice.gov/archive/mps/strategic2003-2008/chapter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GYM-U4Q3].
2. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
361 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XUB-
PB3Q] (“The nation has committed enormous resources to national security and to countering
terrorism.”).
3. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.9-10.
4. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROS-
ECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 19 (2008), https://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB3U-GBLQ].
5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 §§ 303, 323, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A-
B (2012). This Note focuses on § 2339B, which states:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so shall be fined ... or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. III 2015); see also Introduction, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., Sept.
2014, at 1, 1, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/09/23/usab6205.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76K8-WFHV] (explaining that the DOJ uses the material support statutes
to target funding of terror organizations).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
7. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 31 (2010).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
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tion for political purposes or humanitarian aid, allows the organiza-
tion to siphon other funds for the planning and commission of illegal
acts.9 Congress recognized “that terrorist organizations can have
multiple wings, [including] military, political, and social, and that
material support to any of these wings ultimately supports the
organization’s violent activities.”10
Although § 2339B’s primary purpose is to target terror funding,11
the statute proscribes other kinds of support as well.12 The scope of
§ 2339B is found in § 2339A,13 which encompasses practically any
kind of aid imaginable.14 Specifically, § 2339B criminalizes the act
of knowingly providing “material support or resources” to “foreign
terrorist organization[s]” (FTOs).15 Because the definition of support
9. See United States v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1058 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“Congress
made a specific finding that ‘foreign organizations that engaged in terrorist activity are so
tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B advisory note)); Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales,
380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining Congress’s concern about terrorist
organizations raising funds “under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise”
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43 (1995))), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
But see Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and
Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1414-15 (2004) (arguing that a well-intentioned donor giving
money to a “seemingly legitimate charitable organization” will probably not consider that
money is fungible, or that the money might fund an FTO).
10. Michael Taxay et al., What to Charge in a Terrorist Financing or Facilitation Case,
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., Sept. 2014, at 9, 9-10, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/
legacy/2014/09/23/usab6205.pdf [https://perma.cc/76K8-WFHV].
11. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 15 (2005) (explaining that Congress based
§ 2339B on the “finding ... that ‘the provision of funds to organizations that engage in
terrorism serves to facilitate their terrorist endeavors regardless of whether the funds, in
whole or in part, are intended or claimed to be used for non-violent purposes’” (quoting S. 390,
104th Cong. § 301 (1995))).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2012); ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 4, at 34.
13. Under this statute, “material support or resources” includes: “[A]ny property ... or ser-
vice, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identifi-
cation, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, person-
nel ... and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
14. See Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 297, 299 (2008).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); see Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [https://perma.cc/5FT3-9EAS].
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is so broad,16 the FTO designation essentially “makes the [organiza-
tion] ‘radioactive’ to persons within U.S. jurisdiction.”17
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA), the
State Department is responsibile for designating groups as FTOs.18
Currently, the State Department has designated sixty-six organiza-
tions.19 Unfortunately, the State Department’s FTO designation
process is political and slow to adapt to changing circumstances.20
For example, the State Department designated the group “Jam’at
al-Tawhid wa’al Jihad” as an FTO in 2004.21 The group’s leader, the
infamous Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,22 changed the name of the or-
ganization two days later.23 It took the State Department approx-
imately ten weeks to amend the FTO list to reflect the changed
name.24 This loophole is important: “If an organization is not desig-
nated as a[n] FTO at the time support is provided, there is no crime”
under § 2339B.25
Fast forwarding to nearly two decades after the September 11 at-
tacks, the government has used § 2339B more than any other
statute to prosecute terrorism.26 Despite inadequacies, § 2339B has
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
17. Taxay et al., supra note 10, at 10.
18. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 219, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2012). The INA
enables the State Department to designate an organization as an FTO if three criteria are
met: (1) the organization must be foreign; (2) the organization must engage in terrorist
activity as defined by the INA or the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, or must “retain[ ]
the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism”; and (3) the “terrorist
activity or terrorism of the organization [must] threaten[ ] the security of [U.S.] nationals or
the national security of the United States.” Id. The FTO designation remains in place for two
years, after which the State Department has the option to redesignate the organization for
another two-year period if the organization’s activities still fall under the statutory
requirements. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).
19. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 15.
20. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 347 (“[T]he FTO approach is a fairly static approach
to a very dynamic situation.”).
21. See id.
22. See Mary Anne Weaver, The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ATLANTIC
(June 8, 2006), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-
of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/ [https://perma.cc/XKS4-N95A] (At one point in time, the
United States offered twenty-five million dollars as a reward for turning in al-Zarqawi,
because he was “one of the most wanted men in the world”).
23. Peterson, supra note 14, at 347.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Tom Stacy, The “Material Support” Offense: The Use of Strict Liability in the War
Against Terror, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461, 461 (2005). Notably, the government used
2019] UNITED STATES ANTITERROR LAW IS MISSING THE MARK 1047
been a relatively effective means of prosecuting supporters of ter-
ror.27 Yet, the United States needs to recognize that as national
security law has changed to accommodate the rise of terrorism in
the world, terror networks have also evolved.28 Although many of
the greatest terror threats to the United States come from already
designated FTOs,29 many threats to national security come from
amorphous and expansive terror networks and the trend of “home-
grown violent extremists.”30 Prosecutors now face difficulties be-
cause organizations use front companies, suborganizations, and
“offshoots” with other names.31 These fronts and offshoots are still
a part of the larger terrorist network, and they work towards the
same detrimental goals.32 But if an individual gives support or
resources to a terrorist organization that the State Department has
not designated as an FTO, federal prosecutors cannot indict that
individual under § 2339B.33
This Note argues that the language in § 2339B should be more
inclusive. The language should read: “Whoever knowingly provides
material support or resources to a foreign terror organization,”34 or
other organizations that dominate and control, or are dominated and
controlled by, or affiliated with a foreign terrorist organization,35 “or
§ 2339B to prosecute terror supporters only four times prior to the September 11 attacks. See
Chesney, supra note 11, at 19.
27. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 4, at 36.
28. Peterson, supra note 14, at 298.
29. For example, Hizballah is a designated FTO. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
supra note 15. According to a U.S. intelligence threat assessment, Iran and its “primary
terrorism partner,” the Lebanese Hizballah, will continue to threaten U.S interests and allies
worldwide. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearing Before
the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) [hereinafter Worldwide Threat
Assessment] (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), https://www.
dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PM6K-6B22].
30. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 298; see also Worldwide Threat Assessment, supra note
29, at 5 (“[U.S.]-based homegrown violent extremists ... will remain the most frequent and
unpredictable ... extremist threat to the [U.S.] homeland.”).
31. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 337, 347.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 347.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
35. This Note specifically argues that the phrase, “or other organizations that dominate
and control, or are dominated and controlled by, or affiliated with a foreign terrorist orga-
nization” should be added into § 2339B. The language “dominated and controlled” is borrowed.
See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death of any
person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for
life.”36 Adding this language to the statute enables a more effective
means to prosecute those who support terrorist organizations, and
closes the loophole in U.S. law.37
Adding more inclusive language would still put the onus on the
government to prove the defendant’s requisite mens rea.38 Under
this proposal, the government would have to prove two elements:
first, that the defendant knowingly provided material support, and
second, that the defendant knew the material support was going to
an FTO,39 or a group that (1) was dominated and controlled by an
already designated FTO,40 (2) dominated and controlled an FTO,41
or (3) at the very least, was affiliated with the FTO.42 This statutory
reform would allow the government to prosecute members of front
organizations and offshoots within the overarching terrorist net-
work, regardless of whether the defendant provided material sup-
port to an officially designated FTO. Conversely, this inclusive
approach would extend to individuals providing material support to
an “umbrella” organization, if the State Department already desig-
nated the offshoot or smaller organization as an FTO.43 This pro-
posal creates a dynamic solution for a dynamic problem.44
Part I outlines why prosecution under the material support stat-
utes is effective. Federal prosecutors bring most terrorism charges
under § 2339B because the statute has a limited mens rea compo-
nent,45 allows prosecutors to act preemptively,46 and has expansive
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. III 2015).
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Part I.A.
40. This language encompasses suborganizations and alias groups under the terror
network.
41. This language includes a larger “umbrella” organization.
42. For an example of when a prosecutor would need to use the “affiliated” component, see
infra Part II.B.
43. Part II.B discusses an example of an “umbrella” terrorist organization—the Afghan
Taliban—that the State Department has not designated as an FTO. See infra Part II.B.
44. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 347.
45. See infra Part I.A.
46. See infra Part I.B.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction.47 Part II juxtaposes the current law and
U.S. legal designations with the current reality of modern terror or-
ganizations, and shows how U.S. antiterror law is missing the mark.
Specifically, this Part addresses the myth that terror groups are
single, organized units. Instead, terror networks are massive, con-
stantly changing organizations comprised of many smaller groups.48
Next, Part III argues to reform the language of § 2339B. Finally,
Part IV addresses counterarguments.
As terrorist organizations “adapt quickly to increase their chances
of survival,”49 U.S. antiterror law also needs to change. Thus,
Congress should close the existing loophole, and add the phrase, or
other organizations that dominate and control, or are dominated and
controlled by, or affiliated with a foreign terrorist organization,50 into
§ 2339B.
I. THE PROSECUTORIAL ADVANTAGES UNDER THE MATERIAL
SUPPORT STATUTES
Overhauling the material support statutes is unnecessary.
Section 2339B is a powerful prosecutorial tool,51 and offers several
advantages that this Note’s proposed statutory reform would not
affect.52 There are three main reasons prosecutors have widely used
§ 2339B. First, § 2339B has a unique mens rea component that does
not require the prosecution to connect the “material support” to the
criminal terrorist activity.53 Second, § 2339B allows the government
to prosecute preemptively if there is evidence of “material support”
before a terror act has occurred.54 Third, § 2339B has extensive ju-
risdictional reach.55
47. See infra Part I.C.
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.9.
50. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
51. See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived
from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 7 (2005) (“[The material
support] offenses constitute unusually potent prosecutorial weapons.”).
52. See infra Part III.
53. See infra Part I.A.
54. See infra Part I.B.
55. See infra Part I.C.
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A. Limited Criminal Intent Component
Section 2339B’s first advantage is that it does not have an
onerous mens rea component. This “limited criminal intent compo-
nent”56 requires the government to prove criminal liability through
two knowledge elements: that the defendant (1) knowingly provided
“material support” to the organization, and (2) knew that the or-
ganization was a designated FTO or engaged in terrorist activity.57
In other words, Congress does not require specific intent under
§ 2339B.58 The defendant only has to knowingly give “material
support or resources” to an FTO, but does not have to intend for that
aid to further the FTO’s criminal enterprise.59 Prosecutors do not
have to prove that the defendant’s aid actually helped materialize
a criminal act.60
The Supreme Court considered this issue in Holder v. Humani-
tarian Law Project.61 The case involved two designated FTOs: the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam.62 Six domestic organizations sued, claiming that § 2339B
criminalized their aid supporting the groups’ “humanitarian and
political activities.”63 The plaintiffs challenged § 2339B on the
grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth
Amendment, and that it violated their freedoms of speech and
association under the First Amendment.64
56. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 4, at 35.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 129 (2d Cir.
2011).
58. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 18 (“[Section 2339B] prohibit[s] the provision of ... aid
under any circumstances irrespective of the provider’s intent or belief about how the recipient
will use it.” (emphasis added)); Peterson, supra note 14, at 335 (“To violate §[ ]2339B, one only
has to know that a group is listed or has engaged in any terrorist activity in the past.”); see
also United States v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1058 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[Section] 2339B
encompasse[s] donors who, though contributing to FTOs, act[ ] without the intent to further
federal crimes.” (emphasis added)); Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d
1134, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[Section 2339B] prohibits the conduct of providing material
support or resources to an organization that one knows is a designated [FTO] or is engaged
in terrorist activities.” (emphasis added)).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); see ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 4, at 35.
60. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 4, at 35.
61. 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010).
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 10-11.
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The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, holding that
“Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation
of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’s con-
nection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization’s
terrorist activities.”65 The Court further reasoned that “[m]aterial
support” to an FTO in any form helps legitimize the organization.66
In turn, legitimacy helps terror organizations recruit new mem-
bers and raise more funds, ultimately allowing them to adapt and
persevere.67 Recognizing that terror organizations “systematically
conceal their activities behind charitable, social, and political
fronts,” the Court held that the limited criminal intent component
was justified because FTOs “do not maintain legitimate financial
firewalls between those funds raised for civil, nonviolent activities,
and those ultimately used to support violent terrorist operations.”68
This limited criminal intent component is also unique to
§ 2339B.69 For example, proving “material support” under § 2339A
requires the government to prove that the defendant provided
support with the intent or knowledge that it will further terrorist
activity.70 This requires the prosecution to connect the aid with the
terrorist act, which is frequently difficult.71 In reality, support can
be “innocuous,” such as money, food, and communication methods.72
Section 2339B allows prosecutors to disrupt support to terrorist
organizations without having to make the evidentiary connection
that the defendant gave the particular aid with the intent to further
an illegal act.73 Simply stated, § 2339B’s “list-based”74 approach and
65. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted).
69. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 335.
70. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 12-13 (describing § 2339A as more of an “aiding-and-
abetting statute”); Peterson, supra note 14, at 335.
71. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 348 (explaining that the statute would reach in cases
when there is “evidence of a specific terrorist plot,” but that such evidence is difficult to ob-
tain). Section 2339B served to fill the hole that § 2339A left open: the inability to criminalize
support when the government could not prove that a defendant was supporting terror with
the specific intent to further a terror act. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 13.
72. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 348.
73. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
74. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 297.
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its limited mens rea component are greatly beneficial to pros-
ecutors.75
B. Prevention Approach
Section 2339B’s second advantage is that it embodies the DOJ’s
prevention approach.76 The “material support” legislation is unique
because it potentially criminalizes a broad range of activities, in-
cluding those that may otherwise not be associated with terror
activity.77 For example, the DOJ has prosecuted “major charities,
money launderers, business organizations, grassroots fundraisers,
cab drivers, door-to-door solicitors, drug traffickers, and others”
under the material support statutes.78 Ultimately, the “prevention
approach” means that prosecutors do not have to sit and wait until
a terrorist act occurs to indict an individual under § 2339B.
The Lackawanna Six case is one famous example of the pre-
vention approach.79 In that case, six Yemeni-American men trained
under al Qaeda to “wage war against” the United States and Is-
rael.80 The U.S. government did not have hard evidence that the six
defendants were planning to carry out a terror plot, but prosecutors
proffered that the Lackawanna Six were waiting on instructions
from Osama bin Laden to carry out a terror attack in the United
75. See Abrams, supra note 51, at 7.
76. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 39-44 (discussing how the government may invoke the
material support statutes to prosecute defendants before they commit a terrorist act).
77. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 301; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 178-79 (1995)
(“Because the activities of many ‘controversial’ political groups also have a large humanitarian
component, the bill’s restrictions on fundraising are likely to have a significant adverse impact
on relief efforts in troubled parts of the world.”). There are other examples of revenue sources.
See, e.g., ISIS Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.
html [https://perma.cc/B947-NYQV] (last updated Dec. 12, 2017). For instance, the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) raises revenue from a variety of sources, including “oil pro-
duction and smuggling, taxes, ransoms from kidnappings, selling stolen artifacts, extortion
and controlling crops.” Id.
78. Michael Taxay, Trends in the Prosecution of Terrorist Financing and Facilitation, U.S.
ATTORNEYS’ BULL., Sept. 2014, at 2, 8, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/
2014/09/23/usab6205.pdf [https://perma.cc/76K8-WFHV].
79. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 39-44.
80. Richard A. Serrano, Last ‘Lackawanna Six’ Defendant Pleads Guilty, L.A. TIMES (May
20, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/may/20/nation/na-lackawanna20 [https://perma.cc/
UE9C-QCR3].
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States.81 A federal grand jury indicted all six men for providing
material support to an FTO.82 All six defendants eventually pled
guilty.83
Other cases illustrate how prosecutors can use the material
support statutes as prevention tools when there is evidence that the
defendant already began preparations to carry out a terror attack.84
For example, Iyman Faris also pled guilty to providing material sup-
port to al Qaeda by plotting to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge.85 Like
the Lackawanna Six defendants, Faris had traveled to Pakistan and
Afghanistan to meet with Osama bin Laden and other top al Qaeda
leaders.86 After returning to the United States, Faris planned to sev-
er the Brooklyn Bridge’s suspension cables with blowtorches.87
Defendants such as the Lackawanna Six and Faris illustrate how
prosecutors can be proactive under § 2339B. This kind of prosecu-
tion embodies the DOJ’s vision for restructuring its reactionary ap-
proach to a preventative approach after the September 11 attacks.88
C. Jurisdictional Reach
Section 2339B’s third important advantage is its jurisdictional
reach. Section 2339B contains two statements of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction.89 First, § 2339B(d)(2) generally grants extraterritorial ju-
risdiction.90 Second, the statute confers extraterritorial jurisdiction
over any offender who is a (1) U.S. national or citizen, (2) “habitual”
81. David Hancock, ‘Lackawanna Six’ Indicted, CBS NEWS (Oct. 22, 2002, 3:04 PM), https:
//www.cbsnews.com/news/lackawanna-six-indicted/ [https://perma.cc/4B5N-F735].
82. Id. The State Department designated al Qaeda (spelled “al-Qa’ida”) as an FTO on
October 8, 1999. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 15.
83. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 4, at 18.
84. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Trucker Sentenced to 20 Years in Plot Against Brooklyn
Bridge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/29/us/trucker-sentenced-
to-20-years-in-plot-against-brooklyn-bridge.html [https://perma.cc/3PAY-BU46].
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.9.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)-(2) (2012). Extraterritorial jurisdiction is when a state or court
asserts “any form of jurisdiction over a person ... that is outside the physical jurisdiction of the
state or the court asserting the jurisdiction.” Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., 2012).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(2).
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resident, or (3) person who comes to the United States after com-
mitting an offense.91 Further, extraterritorial jurisdiction attaches
if the offense “occurs in whole or in part” in the United States, or if
it “affects interstate or foreign commerce.”92
Notably, courts have required a “jurisdictional nexus” when the
government charges a noncitizen acting entirely abroad under
§ 2339B.93 These courts require that “the aim of [the prohibited]
activity [must be] to cause harm inside the United States or to U.S.
citizens or interests.”94 Ultimately, this broad extraterritorial ju-
risdiction allows prosecutors to indict U.S. citizens or nationals, as
well as foreign nationals, who have provided material support to
FTOs under § 2339B.
In sum, there are several compelling advantages to the current
system, rendering § 2339B a useful prosecutorial tool. Section
2339B’s mens rea component does not require prosecutors to prove
that the material support actually aided criminal terrorist activity.95
Rather, prosecutors must only prove that the defendant knowingly
gave material support, and that the support was going to a desig-
nated FTO.96 Further, § 2339B allows prosecutors to act with the
information that an individual has provided material support to an
FTO, rather than having to wait for a terrorist act to occur.97 Lastly,
§ 2339B has expansive jurisdictional reach, permitting prosecutors
to indict U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, if the support is con-
nected to harming the United States.98
91. Id. § 2339B(d)(1)(A)-(C).
92. Id. § 2339B(d)(1)(D)-(E).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011); United States
v. Naseer, 38 F. Supp. 3d 269, 272-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
94. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN
OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. §2339A AND §2339B, at 23 (2016) (citing Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118;
Naseer, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 272-73).
95. See supra Part I.A.
96. See supra Part I.A.
97. See supra Part I.B.
98. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE PROBLEM: UNITED STATES ANTITERROR LAW IS MISSING
THE MARK
Although § 2339B is a useful prosecutorial tool, there is a sub-
stantial loophole in U.S. antiterror law.99 This Part will explain why
U.S. law is missing the mark. First, this Part will outline the State
Department’s available “weapons” against terror funding and sup-
port. These weapons include designating FTOs, as well as “Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” (SDNs).100 The latter
designation is a way that the State Department, along with the
Treasury Department, can block individuals’ and organizations’
assets from the United States.101 Second, this Part will explain why
a politicized State Department, and their inherent dealings with
delicate diplomatic situations, creates a legal inconsistency and
undermines § 2339B’s effectiveness. Lastly, this Part will explore
why § 2339B’s focus on static organizations is shortsighted, and
discuss the reality of terror networks.
A. The Current Designation Processes
U.S. federal agencies have two main processes to designate en-
tities that are harmful to the United States’s interests: the FTO
designation and the SDN designation.102 These designations carry
consequences for individuals and organizations.103 This Part delves
into the distinction between the two designations, illustrating the
politicization and discrepancies in U.S. antiterror law.
99. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
100. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
101. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
102. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
103. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text; infra notes 111-14, 119 and accompa-
nying text. 
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1. Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation
The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Secretary of
State to designate FTOs.104 The process takes three steps.105 First,
the Bureau of Counterterrorism identifies a group that the State
Department should potentially designate as an FTO.106 Second, if
the Secretary of State finds sufficient evidence to designate the
organization,107 then the Secretary notifies Congress of the potential
designation.108 Congress then has seven days to stop the designa-
tion.109 Third, if Congress fails to act, then the State Department
publishes the designation in the Federal Register, which is when the
designation becomes effective.110
It is noteworthy that when the State Department designates an
organization as an FTO, the affected organization faces conse-
quences111 other than the potential criminal liability for providing
“material support” under § 2339B.112 First, FTO members and rep-
resentatives cannot enter the United States.113 Second, if a U.S.
financial institution realizes that it possesses funds “in which a
designated FTO or its agent has an interest,” the financial insti-
tution must freeze the assets and report the funds to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control.114
Organizations can appeal an FTO designation to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.115 However, on-
ly the organization itself can challenge the designation.116 Defen-
dants charged under § 2339B are unable to challenge the FTO
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2012).
105. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
106. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 15.
107. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
108. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 15.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. An extended discussion of these consequences is outside of this Note’s purview.
Further, this Note’s argument does not extend these consequences to other organizations
under its proposed statutory reform.
112. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
113. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227(a)(1)(A) (2012).
114. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 15; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C)
(2012).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1).
116. See id. § 1189(a)(8), (c)(1).
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designation117 because courts have determined that the designa-
tion does not violate individual due process rights.118
2. Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entities
This Note has focused on FTO designations thus far. However, an
FTO designation is not the only designation the U.S. government
can use to impede terror funding. The State Department has an ad-
ditional tool: Executive Order 13,224 “provides a means by which to
disrupt the financial support network for terrorists and terrorist
organizations by authorizing the U.S. government to designate and
block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or
pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism.”119 
In other words, labeling an “individual” or “entity” as an SDN
is a way the State Department can designate terror-organization
supporters and create legal consequences for them, but without the
FTO label.120 The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Sec-
retary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, can designate for-
eign individuals or entities that pose a terror threat to the United
States, or “assist in, sponsor, or provide financial material, or tech-
nological support for, or financial or other services to or in support
of, acts of terrorism or individuals or entities.”121 This definition is
remarkably similar to § 2339B, which prohibits “knowingly pro-
vid[ing] material support or resources.”122
117. Id. § 1189(a)(8) (“[A] defendant in a criminal action ... shall not be permitted to raise
any question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation as a defense.”).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1019 (8th Cir. 2015).
119. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Executive Order 13224 (Sept. 23, 2001) (emphasis
added), https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/122570.htm [https://perma.cc/9FHG-CT9Z].
President Bush signed Executive Order 13,224 in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Id.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control lists individuals and entities affiliated with countries,
but also individuals and entities “such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers” that are not
“country-specific.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND
BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (SDN) HUMAN READABLE LISTS , https://www. treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/S6SV-7WK6] (last updated
Aug. 24, 2018, 11:59 AM). These entities’ “assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally
prohibited from dealing with them.” Id.
120. The State Department collectively designates “individuals, groups, and entities” on
the SDN list. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 119; see also Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of State, supra note 119.
121. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 119 (emphasis added). 
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
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B. The Legal Inconsistency
Having both the FTO designation and the SDN designation cre-
ates a legal inconsistency in U.S. antiterror law. The SDN desig-
nation exists to provide the government an avenue to block enti-
ties’ or individuals’ assets, and prevent interaction between U.S.
citizens and terrorist groups.123 Yet, individuals that provide “ma-
terial support or resources” to an entity designated as an SDN are
not subject to criminal liability under § 2339B, because they may
not be providing support to an FTO.124 And there are organizations
on the SDN list that should arguably be designated as an FTO
for purposes of § 2339B.125
For example, the Tehrik-e Taliban of Pakistan is on the State
Department’s FTO list,126 but Afghanistan’s Taliban is not.127 Yet,
the Afghan Taliban fulfills the criteria for the State Department to
designate it as an FTO, including “engag[ing] in terrorism and
threaten[ing] the security of U.S. nationals or the national security
of the United States.”128 The State Department has not designated
the Afghan Taliban as an FTO because of a “concern that applying
the terror label to the group would restrict U.S. and Afghan gov-
ernment diplomatic contacts with the Taliban, making peace talks
more difficult.”129
There is further damning evidence. The Haqqani Network’s
leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani,130 and al Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al
123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
125. See, e.g., Ioannis Koskinas, Call the Taliban What They Are—Terrorists, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Feb. 19, 2015, 10:16 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/19/call-the-taliban-what-
they-are-terrorists/ [https://perma.cc/G6Q9-L6C2].
126. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 15.
127. See Masood Farivar, Why Isn’t Afghan Taliban on US List of Foreign Terror Groups?,
VOICE AM. (Feb. 20, 2017, 5:11 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-taliban-us-list-
foreign-terror-groups/3732453.html [https://perma.cc/U5VM-RUTE].
128. Id. (The Pakistan Taliban and the Afghan Taliban not only “call themselves the
Taliban,” but they also “regularly carry out deadly suicide bombings, kill civilians with im-
punity and ... behave like brutish terrorist groups”). The Afghan Taliban also controls large
portions of Afghanistan territory, and aspires to govern the country. See id.
129. Id.
130. The Haqqani Network is infamously known for holding U.S. Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl
in captivity for five years. See generally David Zucchino et al., Bowe Bergdahl’s Captors: Who,
Where and Why?, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2014, 7:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world/
afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-bergdahl-captivity-20140615-story.html [https://perma.cc/YE2S-
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Zawahiri131—two leaders of two designated FTOs—“have repeatedly
pledged allegiance to Mullah Mohammad Omar, the reclusive leader
of the Afghan Taliban.”132 In other words, the Haqqani Network,
which is “officially subsumed under the larger Taliban umbrella
organization led by Mullah Omar and his ... Taliban,” is a desig-
nated FTO, and the Afghan Taliban, the actual “umbrella organiza-
tion,” is not.133 The reality that organizations “pledg[ing] fealty to
Mullah Omar are designated FTOs yet the Afghan Taliban [is] not
simply defies logic.”134 It seems that even if it walks like a duck, and
quacks like a duck, the State Department will not call it a duck135 if
there are other diplomatic considerations at stake.136
This kind of politicization and legal inconsistency illustrates why
the current “list-based approach” under § 2339B is inadequate.
Under this scheme, the government could not indict an individual
providing “material support” to the Afghan Taliban under § 2339B,
because the State Department has not designated it as an FTO.137
Yet, the government could indict an individual providing material
KDQY]. In addition, U.S. officials linked a Pakistani-American named Faisal Shahzad to the
Haqqani network. Id. Shahzad attempted to car-bomb Times Square in New York City, but
his homemade bomb ultimately never exploded. Id.
131. Al Qaeda named Ayman al-Zawahiri as their new leader on June 16, 2011, after
Osama bin Laden’s death. See Al-Qaeda’s Remaining Leaders, BBC NEWS (June 16, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11489337 [https://perma.cc/F87C-UDLA].
132. Koskinas, supra note 125. Note that both organizations, the Haqqani Network and al
Qaeda, are designated FTOs. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 15. The State
Department designated the Haqqani Network as an FTO on September 19, 2012, and al
Qaeda (spelled “al-Qa’ida”) on October 8, 1999. Id.
133. See JEFFREY A. DRESSLER, THE HAQQANI NETWORK: FROM PAKISTAN TO AFGHANISTAN
2 (2010) (emphasis added), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_
Network_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB63-J3ZF]. Although the Haqqani Network is under the
larger “Taliban umbrella,” Jeffrey Dressler explains that the Haqqani Network “maintain[s]
distinct command and control, and lines of operations.” Id. In other words, under this Note’s
paradigm, the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban would be “affiliated” entities. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
134. Koskinas, supra note 125.
135. Indeed, the U.S. government will only call the Afghan Taliban “armed insurgents.” Id.
136. See id. (“Obama’s national security team has been able to engage in low-key peace
negotiations with the Taliban that would be more difficult to pursue if the Taliban were a
designated FTO.”); see also Mushtaq Yusufzai et al., Taliban Begins Secret Peace Talks with
U.S., Afghan Officials: Sources, NBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2016, 10:45 AM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/world/taliban-begins-secret-peace-talks-u-s-afghan-officials-sources-n668131
[https://perma.cc/452P-T6G3] (discussing U.S. interests in promoting peace talks between the
Afghans and the Taliban).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
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support to the Haqqani Network, a terror organization under the
official “umbrella” of the Afghan Taliban,138 under § 2339B.139 This
illustrates why U.S. antiterror law is missing the mark. Reforming
the language of § 2339B would allow federal prosecutors to “bypass”
the State Department’s politicized designation process, and pros-
ecute those that truly present a terror threat to the United States. 
C. The Factual Inconsistency: Realities of Modern-Day Terrorism
On top of the legal inconsistency, U.S. law does not align with
reality. U.S. antiterror law focuses on discrete organizations.140
However, this approach is misguided.141 Scholar and attorney An-
drew Peterson summarizes: “Terrorist groups are evolving. Today,
fewer terrorists are still affiliated with structured organizations;
instead, the greatest terrorist threat to the United States comes
from a diffuse global network of terrorists. These individuals ...
move between and among terrorist groups and causes without nec-
essarily ever becoming ‘members’ of any particular organization.”142
Over the last two decades, terrorist groups have grown away from
organizational and bureaucratic structures, and into networks.143
For example, “[a]l Qaeda is not a close-knit, hierarchical terrorist
organization; it is a brand that represents the products of many
different terrorists.”144 Although the different sections within these
terror networks sometimes work together, they often remain semi-
autonomous.145 Further, as terrorist networks have grown, so has
their efficacy and dangerousness.146 Whereas “[t]raditional, hierar-
chical organizations are extremely vulnerable to decapitation[,] ....
[n]etworked organizations are resilient.”147
138. See DRESSLER, supra note 133, at 2.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
140. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 298.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 339-40.
144. Id. at 340.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 341.
147. Id.
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One of the most recent examples of this phenomenon is the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, commonly known as ISIS.148
According to the U.S. intelligence community’s threat assessment,
“[o]utside Iraq and Syria, ISIS is seeking to foster interconnected-
ness among its global branches and networks, align their efforts to
ISIS’s strategy, and withstand counter-ISIS efforts. We assess that
ISIS maintains the intent and capability to direct, enable, assist,
and inspire transnational attacks.”149 In other words, ISIS is a
terrorist network that resembles a “deadly virus[ ].”150 
To make things even more complex, terror networks often receive
support from a range of sources, including charitable organi-
zations.151 For example, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development (HLF) posed as a charitable organization by “fun-
neling money through Zakat Committees and Charitable Socie-
ties.”152 In reality, the HLF was Hamas’s main fundraiser in the
United States.153 The illicit drug trade and sale of counterfeit goods
are also large sources of funding for terror organizations.154 Further,
terrorist networks sometimes use front companies that “operate [as]
legitimate businesses, which generate their own profits and can also
be used as a front for money laundering.”155
The reality is that terrorist networks are dynamically complex in
their organizational and fundraising structures.156 Terrorist net-
works are not stagnant hierarchical entities or singular groups of
148. See Worldwide Threat Assessment, supra note 29, at 2, 5. ISIS has several different
names, including the “Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham,” the “Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL),” and the “Islamic State.” See id. at 2; ISIS Fast Facts, supra note 77.
149. See Worldwide Threat Assessment, supra note 29, at 5 (emphasis added).
150. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2.9.
151. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) (explaining that the
plaintiffs were U.S. citizens and six domestic organizations, including a human rights organ-
ization and nonprofit groups); Eben Kaplan, Tracking Down Terrorist Financing, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 4, 2006), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/tracking-down-terrorist-
financing [https://perma.cc/QRM4-UQA6] (explaining that some organizations use zakat, a
pillar of Islam requiring Muslims to give a portion of their wealth to charity, to finance jihad);
supra notes 61-63, 78 and accompanying text.
152. Taxay, supra note 78, at 3.
153. See id. Eventually, the U.S. government convicted the principal agents of the HLF for
providing material support to an FTO, among other crimes. Id.
154. See Kaplan, supra note 151.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 142-47, 151-55 and accompanying text.
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armed forces.157 Instead, they are nebulous organizations that are
often comprised of many smaller groups.158 This reality calls for a
change in U.S. law.
III. THE SOLUTION: AN “INCLUSIVE APPROACH”
Adding language to § 2339B would maintain the current ad-
vantages and close the loophole in U.S. law. The organization-
focused, “list-based approach” cannot effectively target all U.S.
terror enemies.159 Thus, the “list-based”160 approach should be more
inclusive. This proposed alteration to the statutory language is
simple, but has the potential to make U.S. antiterror law more
effective.161 Congress should change § 2339B’s language to: “Who-
ever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization,”162 or other organizations that dominate and
control, or are dominated and controlled by, or affiliated with a
foreign terrorist organization,163 “or attempts or conspires to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned
for any term of years or for life.”164 This approach would allow for
the prosecution of those giving material support to “umbrella” or-
ganizations, front organizations, and offshoots of the larger terror
network under § 2339B.165
This approach is beneficial in three ways. First, it keeps the ad-
vantageous aspects of § 2339B, including the limited criminal intent
component,166 the ability to prosecute before a terror act occurs,167
and its expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction.168 In other words, this
proposed reform does not change the reasons why prosecutors
157. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 298.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
163. This is the phrase that this Note proposes to add into § 2339B. See supra note 35.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. III 2015).
165. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. See supra Part I.B.
168. See supra Part I.C.
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charge terrorism defendants under § 2339B more than any other
antiterror law.169
Second, this change will allow prosecutors to indict terrorists that
are not per se “members” of an already designated FTO. The gov-
ernment will still have to prove that the defendant aided an or-
ganization that is (1) acting under the domination and control of an
already designated FTO; (2) dominating and controlling an FTO (an
“umbrella” organization); or (3) affiliated with an FTO.170 In other
words, the proposed reform would encompass donors and terrorists
that the United States would otherwise prosecute if the State
Department had already designated an organization as an FTO. If
the government can prove that the defendant provided “material
support or resources” to an organization that is connected to the
FTO in at least one of the three ways outlined above, that proof will
be sufficient to satisfy § 2339B’s “foreign terror organization” re-
quirement under the “list-based approach.”171
Finally, the “inclusive approach” is realistic. Congressional re-
forms throughout the last two decades have produced the “material
approach” statute.172 Yet, terror groups have evolved from organiza-
tional structures to networks during that period,173 leaving a
loophole in the law.174 U.S. antiterror law needs to evolve with the
times in order to stay ahead of terrorist networks. Yet, just because
the current law is lacking does not mean Congress should com-
pletely revolutionize it.175 Congress may be more likely to take a
smaller step in the right direction, as opposed to suddenly institut-
ing massive reform.176
This “inclusive approach” also finds support in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia case, National Council
169. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; supra Part I.
170. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012); Peterson, supra note 14, at 297-98.
172. Peterson, supra note 14, at 298 (“Congress has taken incremental steps, and built on
the material support-based system that it put in place in the mid-1990s.”).
173. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 20-25, 31-33 and accompanying text.
175. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 353 (“Although broad reform of the material support
statutes may be preferable to the status quo, such radical reform is, in reality, unlikely to be
adopted.”). But see id. at 349-53 (arguing for broad reform).
176. See id. at 353.
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of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State.177 In that case, a dis-
pute arose when the State Department redesignated the Mojahedin-
e Khalq (MEK) and its “alias,” the National Council of Resistance of
Iran (NCRI), as FTOs.178 The NCRI appealed, arguing that it was
merely an MEK member organization, and not an “alias.”179 Thus,
the NCRI argued that they should not be subject to the FTO des-
ignation.180 The court rejected the NCRI’s claim, holding that “the
grant of authority to designate FTOs ‘implies the authority to so
designate an entity that commits the necessary terrorist acts un-
der some other name.’”181 The court illustrated this concept with the
mathematical idea of “transitive property,” finding that “if A equals
B and B equals C, it follows that A equals C. If the NCRI is the
[MEK], and if the [MEK] is a foreign terrorist organization, then
the NCRI is a foreign terrorist organization also.”182
The court further held that the “alias” concept should be con-
strued broadly under the doctrine of agency law.183 In other words,
it was just as implausible for Congress to intend that an FTO could
evade designation by “giv[ing] itself a new name” and “happily
resum[ing]” its prior status, as it was for Congress to intend that
an FTO could “marshal[ ] ... support via juridically separate agents
subject to its control.”184 The court in National Council of Resis-
tance of Iran v. Department of State recognized that modern ter-
ror networks forged a new reality.185 Although the court considered
the FTO designation issue,186 its reasoning has important impli-
cations for prosecution under § 2339B. The State Department may
designate “alias” organizations of FTOs.187 However, if the State
177. 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
178. Id. at 153-54.
179. Id. at 156.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 200
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
182. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at
200).
183. Id. at 157.
184. Id. at 157-58.
185. See id.
186. The court considered whether the State Department properly designated the NCRI
as an “alias” of the MEK, and thus as an FTO, but did not consider issues regarding criminal
liability or prosecution under § 2339B. See id. at 154.
187. Id. at 157-58.
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Department fails to designate an alias organization or a group
within a larger network, then U.S. antiterror law is still missing
the mark.188
The D.C. Circuit aptly used this example: “[T]he Government
could designate XYZ organization as an FTO in an effort to block
[U.S.] support to that organization, but could not, without a sep-
arate FTO designation, ban the transfer of material support to
XYZ’s fundraising affiliate, FTO Fundraiser, Inc.”189 Federal pros-
ecutors’ hands should not be tied when they have information that
a potential defendant aided a terror organization simply because the
State Department has not designated a terror organization as an
FTO. Thus, a more inclusive approach seeks to allow the prosecu-
tion of terror supporters if they provide “material support or re-
sources” to an FTO’s network.190
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES
Critics may point to two key arguments against this Note’s pro-
posal. First, critics may argue that adding more inclusive language
to § 2339B will expand potential criminal liability to too many peo-
ple.191 Second, critics may assert that expanding prosecutorial power
under § 2339B will undermine the State Department’s diplomacy
efforts.192
A. Expanding Criminal Liability
A concern with § 2339B is that it criminalizes humanitarian
aid.193 The argument follows that the proposed revision of § 2339B
would give the government the opportunity to prosecute those who
do not actually threaten U.S. national security, such as well-mean-
ing donors to humanitarian organizations.194 Scholar Nina Crimm
188. See supra notes 20-25, 31-33 and accompanying text.
189. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 373 F.3d at 158.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
191. See infra Part IV.A.
192. See infra Part IV.B.
193. See Crimm, supra note 9, at 1414.
194. See id. (“[W]ell-intentioned donors still may be exposed to liability.”).
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argues that, even absent more inclusive language, § 2339B bestows
“tremendous” prosecutorial power.195
There are two main responses to this argument. First, § 2339B’s
mens rea requirement inherently checks prosecutorial power.196
This Note’s proposed statutory revision undoubtedly depends on
responsible prosecutorial power. However, prosecutors still must
prove that the defendant knowingly gave “material support or
resources”197 to an FTO or a related entity.198 For example, if an
individual donates money to what the individual believes is a char-
itable organization, and the individual honestly does not know that
the aid supports terrorist activity in reality, then the mens rea
requirement protects that individual, and the individual is not
subject to criminal liability.199 
The Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project em-
phasized that “Congress ... settled on ... a natural stopping place:
The statute reaches only material support coordinated with or un-
der the direction of a designated [FTO].”200 This “stopping place”201
is still applicable if Congress revises § 2339B to add more inclusive
language.202 Even though the revision expands the FTO’s definition
under § 2339B to reflect the expansion of terrorist networks,203 pros-
ecutors must still prove their case.204 The proposed statutory reform
removes the potential blockade of the politicized FTO designation
process, and allows prosecutors to indict those within the statute’s
true spirit, only if there is sufficient evidence to prove the defen-
dant’s knowledge mens rea.205
Second, Congress and the Supreme Court both recognized that
money is fungible.206 Congress considered that § 2339B could have
195. See id. at 1414 n.338.
196. See supra notes 38-42, 56-60 and accompanying text.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
198. See supra notes 38-42, 56-60 and accompanying text.
199. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010).
200. Id. at 31.
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part II.C.
204. See supra notes 38-42, 56-60 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
206. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 178-79 (1995); supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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a chilling effect on humanitarian aid.207 Ultimately, Congress ac-
cepted that consequence.208 Congress recognized that even if some-
one donated one million dollars to a terror organization specifically
for humanitarian purposes, that the donation would provide the
terror organization one million dollars to organize and carry out acts
of terror.209 Further, the Supreme Court reasoned in Holder that be-
cause support is “fungible,” any aid or material support ultimately
helps organizations further their criminal enterprise and strengthen
their legitimacy.210
This counterargument’s reasoning, if followed, undermines the
entire purpose of the material support legislation, and inherently
the legal method Congress chose to disrupt terror funding via the
U.S. criminal justice system.211 Under this argument, defendants
could merely contend that they gave “material support” to an
organization, but that the aid was only meant to go towards
humanitarian or political purposes.212 Congress expressly elimi-
nated this defense.213
B. Undermining Diplomacy Efforts
A second counterargument is that a more inclusive approach
will undermine the State Department’s diplomatic abilities. The
proposed statutory reform undoubtedly removes some State De-
partment authority and allows the DOJ to “bypass” the State De-
partment’s politicized FTO designation process.214 Ultimately, the
DOJ will have the authority to indict supporters of groups connect-
ed to an already designated FTO that the State Department has
failed to designate.215
207. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 178-79.
208. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010). 
209. See id. at 31.
210. See id. at 30.
211. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
212. This is exactly what the plaintiffs argued in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. See
561 U.S. at 10.
213. See supra notes 58, 65 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part II.B.
215. See supra Part III.
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The State Department is inevitably politicized,216 and diplomatic
situations can be fragile, at best.217 Scholar Andrew Peterson has
argued that the State Department’s politicization hinders terrorism
prosecution.218 Peterson also acknowledged that the State Depart-
ment has “expertise in international affairs and counterterrorism,
[but that] its interests go beyond prosecution” and “foreign policy
interests should not be the only factors considered in the [designa-
tion] process.”219
Either diplomacy efforts with terrorist organizations should take
a back seat to terror prosecution, or the United States should re-
think its diplomatic strategy.220 The United States should aim for
consistency in its foreign policy, increasing U.S. credibility abroad,
and pursuing the “prevention approach” towards terrorist organiza-
tions.221 To continue with the Afghan Taliban example,222 the White
House Press Secretary Josh Earnest once said that the group “pur-
sue[s] terror attacks in an effort to try to advance their agenda.”223
Yet, the United States will only call the Afghan Taliban an “armed
insurgents,” presumably so that the United States can negotiate
with the organization without running afoul of a long-standing pol-
icy of noncooperation with terror groups.224 Yet, the United States
has only undermined its own credibility,225 and negotiated with an
organization that “pursue[s] terror attacks.”226
216. See, e.g., Farivar, supra note 127.
217. See, e.g., Yusufzai et al., supra note 136 (“The Taliban and the Afghan government
have restarted talks aimed at ending that country’s 15-year war.”).
218. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 353.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Mar. 4, 2013, 1:13 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-
afghanistan/ [https://perma.cc/PJ2Q-T86G] (“[T]he United States should [have] recognize[d]
the Taliban and open[ed] diplomatic missions in Afghanistan.... to moderate their behavior.”).
221. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. Jonathan Karl, Taliban Are Not Terrorists, or So Says the White House, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 29, 2015, 4:24 PM) (emphasis added), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/taliban-terrorists-
white-house/story?id=28588120 [https://perma.cc/5LFM-DYNT].
224. Id.
225. See Taliban Tells New U.S. President Trump to Quit Afghanistan, REUTERS (Jan. 23,
2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-afghanistan-taliban/taliban-
tells-new-u-s-president-trump-to-quit-afghanistan-idUSKBN157255 [https://perma.cc/M7W9-
KRSQ] (“[T]he United States ha[s] lost credibility.”).
226. See Karl, supra note 223 (emphasis added).
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Perhaps it is time for the United States to take a more realistic
approach to situations such as the one in Afghanistan. If the Unit-
ed States truly wants to follow the “prevention approach,” then it
should focus more on starving terrorist organizations’ financial
lifeblood and use its prosecutorial power at the negotiation table. An
inclusive approach would put the United States in a position of rel-
ative strength, instead of a position gingerly skirting around U.S.
policy and undermining the United States’s credibility in its global
war on terror.227
CONCLUSION
Congress has the ability to further impair the “deadly viruses” of
terror networks through the U.S. criminal justice system.228 As
terror networks adapt and manipulate loopholes in U.S. law, the
United States must react appropriately by giving federal prosecu-
tors the tools to stop not just supporters of finite groups, but the
tools to combat terror networks.229 Revising § 2339B would enable
federal prosecutors to bypass the State Department’s politicized
FTO designation process230 and prosecute those who truly support
terrorist organizations under § 2339B.231 Because U.S. antiterror
law is currently missing the mark, Congress should reform it to hit
the target.
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